California Internet Obscenity Law Upheld On August 3, 2000, the California Court of Appeals for the First Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the defendant's conviction on two counts of attempting to distribute or exhibit obscene material to a minor via the Internet (Persons). Why and how did this happen? The Court rejected defendant's Commerce Clause and First Amendment challenges to Cal. Quill. Code 288, paragraph 2, letter b) which provides for a crime for any person "who, knowing that he or she is a minor, knowingly distributes, sends, causes to be sent, displays, or offers to distribute or display by electronic mail, the Internet..., to a minor with intent to arouse, appeal to or gratify the sexual lust, passions or desires of that person or a minor, and with intent or for the purpose of seducing a minor, is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison or county prison. A person convicted of a second and any subsequent conviction for a violation of this section is guilty of an undercover Internet investigation, Defendant initiated two “instant messages” with a detective posing as a 14-year-old boy During electronic conversations, Defendant sent photographs, offered to engage in specific sexual acts, and invited the boy to meet him at. his house. The Court held that Section 288.2(b) did not violate the Commerce Clause because “no legitimate commerce would be burdened by the criminalization of transmitting harmful sexual material to known minors for the purpose of seducing them.” Rejecting defendant's contention that the statute subjects Internet users to inconsistent regulations, the Court of Appeals distinguished this statute from the law challenged in American Libraries Ass'n. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (SDNY 1997). The Pataki Court held that the New York statute violated the Commerce Clause because "The nature of the Internet, like that of rail and highway traffic, requires a 'cohesive national scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine the their obligations.'" United) In the absence of national regulations, according to Pataki, Internet users would be subject to inconsistent local statutes governing the content of their communications. The California Court of Appeals held that the “knowledge” and “intent” elements missing from the New York statute but present in Section 288.2(b) were decisive. The Court stated: "Only when the material is disseminated to a known minor with the intent to arouse the lewd interest of the sender and/or the minor and with the intent to seduce the minor, the dissemination becomes a criminal act" . The Court concluded that prohibiting the use of the Internet for these specifically defined and limited purposes does not burden interstate commerce by subjecting Internet users to inconsistent regulations. The Court further found that the statute does not regulate conduct occurring outside of California, stating: "When Section 288.2(b) is harmonized with California's entire penal system, it does not effectively regulate activities outside of California. California prosecutes only those criminal acts that occur wholly or partially within the State... Section 288.2(b) makes no reference to place of execution, so courts must presume that the Legislature did not intend to regulate conduct that takes place outside the State." The Court refused to follow ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the preliminary injunction that