PYRENE CO., LTD. V. SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO., LTDQUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION [1954] 2 QB 402, [1954] 2 All ER 158, [1954] 2 WLR 1005, [1954] 1 Lloyd's Rep 321 HEARING DATES: March 15, 16, 17 , 14 April 1954HEADNOTE: By the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, Schedule, Article I (b): "'Contract of Carriage' applies only to contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading... To the extent where such document relates to the carriage of goods by sea, including any bill of lading... Issued pursuant to a charter party from the time such bill of lading... Regulates the relationship between a carrier and a holder of the same". With Article I, letter e): "'The carriage of goods' covers the period from the moment the goods are loaded to the moment they are unloaded from the ship", and with Article II: " ... Under each contract for the carriage of goods by sea, the carrier in relation to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care and unloading of such goods, will be subject to the responsibilities and obligations and shall be entitled to the rights and immunities hereinafter set forth" In August, 1948, the plaintiffs entered into a contract with the Government of India, through a Government Department ("ISD") by which they agreed to sell to the Government of India a number of tenders for airport accidents, FOB London. All arrangements for the carriage of the goods were made by ISD through its agents, who were also goods brokers for the plaintiffs and appointed one of the defendants' vessels for loading under the contract. In April 1951 the appellants, in accordance with instructions given by the ISD, delivered one of the vessels to the Port of London for loading on board the vessel. In the course of loading within......half document......oyd's Rep 240, the seller would appear to have performed the final act necessary to appropriate the goods to the contract - he certainly could not have realistically called them to the time of the accident? But the conversion argument presupposes that ownership was still vested in the seller, and indeed the seller's claim in tort presupposes this as well. The case may therefore suggest a strong reluctance on the part of the courts to hold that property in an FOB contract passes before shipment.16. Under the Hague Rules, Devlin J. did not like the idea of ​​rights and duties transferring back and forth as the cargo swung on the crane to and from the ship's rail. While these observations are not directed at the issue of risk, they appear to be equally applicable. It has not been decided whether the risk passes FOB at the ship's side or at the end (or beginning) of the loading process.