Introduction Since the first free speech case was brought to the Supreme Court in 1919, the debate over whether it is an absolute or qualified right has continued. As the Court attempts to capture the meaning of the First Amendment and its free speech clause, it creates many tests and qualifications for First Amendment protection. Many of the discussions surrounding exceptions to free speech concern, at least in part, hateful and offensive speech. The paradox that plagues this topic is that speech cannot be qualified without violating some rights, yet speech cannot be absolute without threatening the peace that the rights are intended to protect. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, Cohen v. California and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, among others, highlights the main exceptions that the Court considers in an offensive speech case. Two of the three cases mentioned above granted exceptions to free speech protections, allowing compliance with regulatory statutes. On the other hand, Snyder v. Phelps, Virginia v. Black and RAV v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, represent the Court's view that hate speech has no First Amendment exceptions. Support for the thesis that free speech should be an absolute right can easily be found in the slippery slope argument or the heckler's veto, among others. These two notions that exceptions will undoubtedly lead to the absence of meaningful free speech are neither rare nor unlikely. Matsuda and Lawrence (1993), state that the theory that free speech is an absolute right is “ahistorical and acontextual” (p. 134). However, the need for an absolute interpretation of free speech is summarized through… middle of the paper… his indecent monologue as obscene or offensive speech. The monologue inherently meets the requirements of being “speech” under the First Amendment. Therefore, the only question that remains is whether or not the First Amendment grants the FCC the authority to punish Pacifica for broadcasting indecent content. Although monologue does not fall under any of the three main certain exemptions of the First Amendment, the Court continues to permit regulation because of the context and content of the speech. The judgment on the context and content of the speech derives from the restrictions of time, place and manner that are often placed on speeches of this type. According to the majority opinion, speech is not protected by the First Amendment if it “causes substantial evils which Congress has a right to prevent” (FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 1978, p.. 745).