There are two main characterizations of interaction in the study of international politics, the first is cooperation and the second is bargaining. Cooperation is formally defined as “An interaction in which two or more actors adopt policies that improve the situation of at least one relative to the status quo without making the others worse off” (Slide 23, Dr. B). Essentially a sum positive interaction between the actors. Bargaining, on the other hand, results in a zero-sum interaction between actors. This means that any gain made by a single actor is offset by an equal loss by the other actor. This is the main difference between the two main types of interactions in international politics, the resulting sum of the costs and benefits of the actors. In cooperative interactions there is a net positive-sum outcome and in bargaining interactions there is a zero-sum outcome in terms of costs and benefits. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Despite a variety of reasons why states should cooperate, including the possibility of mutually beneficial outcomes, states often fail to cooperate. There are three important obstacles to cooperation in international politics. The first of these is when a single actor is incentivized to abandon cooperation. These types of interactions in which individual actors have incentives to defect are called collaboration problems according to Frieden, Lake, and Schultz (FLS, 53). This obstacle to cooperation is particularly evident in the prisoner's dilemma. Overall it would be more beneficial for both sides to remain silent, but there is a significant incentive to "snitch" on the other side and take all the spoils instead. The “real life” example that Frieden, Lake, and Schultz use to demonstrate this is the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Each country had a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and continued to build it. As a result of the collaboration problem, each state knew that the other had an incentive to cheat, thus preventing any agreement to be reached to slow or stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons together. The second obstacle to cooperation in international politics concerns the provision of public goods (FLS, 55). Frieden, Lake, and Schultz define public goods as “goods that are individually and socially desirable, non-excludable, and non-rival in consumption, such as national defense.” The problem of collective action, of free riding, is of utmost importance for discussing why public goods may constitute an obstacle to cooperation. The reason why collective action plays such an important role in hindering cooperation is that there is an incentive to free ride. The way individual actors see the situation is: why should one participate if they can reap the benefits without any effort? This thinking is particularly applicable to public goods and this is why they represent a challenge in international politics when it comes to cooperation. Frieden, Lake and Schultz cite a particularly significant example: the Second Gulf War. Obviously many states have a vested interest in defeating a dictator and ending the genocide, but as the United States took control of operations, many took a backseat and allowed the United States to engage. The third obstacle to cooperation in international politics is self-interest. An example mentioned in Robert Axelrod's piece The Evolution ofCooperation, has to do with trade barriers (Axelrod, 7). Imagine that two countries both erect trade barriers. If actors were not selfish they would remove such trade barriers because free trade would be beneficial to the other actor. The reality is, however, that both nations will likely maintain trade barriers because, despite the benefit to the other actor, doing so would result in negative inconsequences for the nation by removing the trade barriers. Furthermore, maintaining the trade barrier once the other actor's barrier is eliminated is extremely advantageous. In this example, self-interest serves as a crucial obstacle to cooperation. Despite a number of reasons why cooperation has the potential to not work, cooperation is not in any way, shape or form unusual. There are three circumstances in particular that lend themselves to cooperation. The first of these situations is when the number of actors is smaller (FLS, 56). When there are fewer actors it is easier to communicate and as Frieden, Lake and Schultz say “If necessary, monitor the behavior of others”. In terms of public goods and the resulting collective action problem, smaller numbers represent another possible aid to cooperation. This is a possible help in the sense that it is easier to identify free-riders and it is much more likely that an actor who imposes the burden of the public good will receive adequate compensation. Another circumstance that favors cooperation in international politics is iteration, defined as “repeated interactions with the same partners” (FLS, 56-57). When actors work together for long periods of time, the likelihood of desertions or parasitism is greatly reduced for a variety of reasons. First, actors will understand that they are expected to work together in the future, preventing defections or parasitism due to the potential benefits of future interactions. Second, actors are likely to engage in some punitive measure against the other actor in the event that the other party defectes or takes advantage. Such a punitive measure could consist of withholding gains from future cooperation measures or withholding cooperation altogether. This uses the concept of linkage defined as “The linking of cooperation on one issue to interactions on a second issue” (FLS, 57). The third situation in which cooperation is more likely is when information availability is high. This allows actors to check whether another actor has cooperated or defected. Furthermore, high availability of information combats uncertainty and misperception. Examples of this can be seen in any election around the world. Individuals are less likely to cooperate and vote for a candidate if there is a lack of information about that candidate or, even worse, there is misinformation about said candidate. Another way cooperation is facilitated is through international institutions. International institutions facilitate cooperation in several ways. The first way is in terms of defining norms and standards of behavior (FLS, 63). This helps avoid any confusion or ambiguity when it comes to cooperation in international politics. These standards also help evaluate whether or not an actor has violated the agreement. The second way in which international institutions facilitate cooperation is to verify compliance (FLS, 64). Along with actual rules and standards for determining compliance, international institutions also obtain information that helps make qualitative and quantitative analyzes of compliance. The third way international institutions facilitate cooperation is through dispute resolution (FLS, 67). The.