What influences the parties' choices between clientelistic and programmatic citizen-politician links? In the context of democratization, many authoritarian regimes used clientelism as the main strategy to maintain their rules (Magaloni 2006). Even in democratic institutions, parties might systematically and continuously engage in clientelism to maintain long-term power (Piattoni 2001, Kitschelt 2007). Those hegemonic parties, once defeated in the elections, found themselves faced with an important choice about where to go. In various accounts, different parties have traversed different lines of development, producing different results. Compared to Shefter's (1977) analysis that the choice of clientelistic/programmatic strategies is fixed and path dependent, this article seeks to address the changes. By investigating two cases of transition of former hegemonic parties after electoral defeat (KMT in Taiwan and PRI in Mexico), I examined why parties made different choices and how these different moves altered party transformation. Furthermore, in conclusion I offered a theoretical framework to differentiate different forms of transformation based on two factors: resource control and ideological strength. Theoretical Terms and Method Two key terms in this article need to be clarified up front: resource control and ideological strength. By resource control I mean in particular the financial resources that parties own and distribute to win elections. Resources include control over the central or local government budget, access to the allocation of public subsidies and other party-owned property. Levels of resource control can be measured by the different positions held by the party and the structure of party spending. Overall this is a perceived direction… middle of the paper… with President Lee Teng-hui openly announcing that Taiwan and mainland China were in fact two different states. This change had angered many pro-unification party bases and motivated some KMT politicians to form the New Party (NP) in 1993. NP became the third largest party and attracted many votes from traditional KMT supporters. After the 2000 elections, James Soong also formed his own party, People First Party (PFP), and replaced NP as the main pro-unification party in the system. As regime fracturing has effectively eased following the success of democratization and regime change, state identity fracturing has become the salient issue of Taiwan's elections. The KMT's ambiguous position on issues of state identity made it difficult to perform well among sharply divided ideological voters, and the party was in danger of losing its”.”.